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Policies versus Practice: “Grey” Areas and “Organized Chaos” 
in Emergency Response 
 
Shawn Jolemore, Nova Scotia Department of Health Promotion and Protection, Canada 
Nancy Taber, Mount Saint Vincent University, Canada 
 
Abstract: Paramedics and firefighters work in unpredictable and often dangerous 
situations. Organizational policies can help in guiding their decision making 
processes, but learning in practice and relying on experience is most helpful in 
their daily work. This paper explores how paramedics and firefighters learn to 
understand their practice through legitimate peripheral participation. 
 
Introduction 
Formal education and training are often perceived as the foundation of workplace 
learning. However, research has shown that much of workers’ learning occurs outside formal 
situations (Hansman, 2001; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Marsick & Watkins, 2001; Wilson, 1993). 
This paper therefore explores how emergency response personnel learn in the practice of their 
everyday work. Our research uses the theoretical approach of legitimate peripheral participation 
(Lave & Wenger, 1991) to focus on learning in practice and understanding versus directive 
documentation (Brown & Duguid, 2000). Legitimate peripheral participation “concerns the 
process by which newcomers become part of a community of practice” which “subsumes the 
learning of knowledgeable skills” (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p. 29). Understanding practice 
conflicts with the directive documentation, which can be described as a linear flow chart that 
“wasn’t designed for sense making. It was designed for rule following” (Brown & Duguid, 2000, 




Our research sites included a paramedic organization with approximately 900 
paramedics; and a firefighting department with approximately 400 firefighters. The key 
components of our research with both organizations included in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with senior administrators, training staff, and front line personnel; observations of 
training sessions; and, ride alongs with paramedics and firefighters in the field. The quotations to 
which we refer below are direct statements from paramedics and firefighters from our various 
interviews, focus groups, and observations. In the course of our research, we learned that each 
organization had recently instituted new policies (paramedic protocols and firefighting incident 
command respectively). The implementation of these policies became the focus of our 
discussions with participants, as they identified the policies as integrated with their learning and 
practice. 
 
Research Findings  
Grey Areas 
Medical protocols are a set of predetermined criteria that define appropriate interventions 
in the administration of emergency patient care and are a means of authorizing the medical 
actions of paramedics in the field; the protocols govern the practice of paramedicine. Although 
some paramedics see these protocols as strict rules that must be strictly followed, many others 
see protocols merely as a guide that helps them to navigate the grey areas of their work. The 
latter group argues that protocols are written only for the straightforward, uncomplicated case. 
Paramedics state, however, that “you’re not going to meet a classic textbook case” outside of the 
classroom and “there is a great amount of grey area in our protocols…they’re not cut and dry.” 
Paramedics also agree that formal clinical knowledge must be combined with less formal “street 
smarts” in order to do the job effectively. This type of situation reflects the tension between 
understanding and “directive documentation” (Brown & Duguid, 2000, pp. 101, 102). If 
organizational workers do not truly understand why they should take a particular action, and 
instead rely solely on documentation, they are less likely to problem-solve and effectively 
respond to emergent situations.  
Compounding this reality is the fact that each paramedic has a specific way of doing 
things depending on training, experience, personality, and each particular situation. One 
paramedic compared the individual styles of paramedics to that of carpenters.  
I don’t think it’s any different than having two different carpenters build a house 
although they’ve probably gone to the same school or…[have] the same education. 
Through practice, they’ve probably adopted different skills, or different tricks of the trade 
to build that same house, and one does it more efficiently than the other or one does it 
better than the other, so it comes down to efficiency with practice and…pride in your 
work, it comes down to aggressiveness versus passiveness; so, your personalities work 
into how you are as a paramedic. 
It seems that there can be a wide variation in both the understanding and practice of 
protocol use. Grey areas necessitate the use of critical thinking and problem-solving skills, 
combined with common sense. Paramedics state that they need to think for themselves instead of 
blindly following protocols. For instance, you “do a better service to the general public” if you 
don’t necessarily follow the protocols exactly but make your own judgments. “If you have a 
critically thinking paramedic you can adapt the protocol to fit….And that’s something you learn 
with experience through paramedicine…not every case is going to be the same, because you 
have to adapt your treatment.” Furthermore, “you are constantly adapting your pathway, 
choosing your protocol” (senior paramedic). 
Paramedics agreed that one’s depth of experience and knowledge is the key to success in 
their profession. Their comments often reflected a “learn as you go” philosophy that suggests the 
more experience and understanding paramedics gain, the greater their comfort working within 
the grey areas of established protocols. The reality is that “not every patient fits into a nice little 
column” (paramedic). In the field, you have to use your “clinical judgment” and “common 
sense” (paramedic). 
From our research, it also seems clear that paramedics who are more senior are more 
adept at keeping the balance between policies and practice. Paramedics, like those in other 
professions, “continuously wrestle with the problem….[of] adapting the particulars of the world 
so that they fit within the schemas of the organization” (Brown & Duguid, 2000, p. 108). Less 
experienced paramedics are often not as flexible adapting to this reality, however. They appear to 
function largely in a linear way, following an “if A happens, do B to get C” (paramedic) 
philosophy. Newer paramedics seem to focus more on the first two components, concentrating 
less on the final outcome and more on the protocols that govern procedure. These paramedics 
tend to become fixated on the “A and B,” which may negatively affect their practice. In contrast, 
their senior colleagues keep patient outcome—the “C”— at the forefront and do not necessarily 
become preoccupied with the “A and B.” They seem to have a better capacity to utilize many 
sources of information concurrently, unencumbered by protocols.  
On rare occasions, textbook-type examples involving a linear approach to treatment do 
occur. For example, during one of our observations, the paramedics were dispatched to treat a 
sports-related injury. The senior paramedic directed his 22 year old partner, who had only two 
years of paramedic experience, to treat the patient. Although the injury was a severe ankle 
dislocation, the required treatment was undemanding and the decisions that the paramedic had to 
make seemed uncomplicated. This may have been because such calls are fairly basic, or because 
the process of treating fractures is sequential, fitting nicely into a protocol-based system. As 
well, this call had no extenuating circumstances. It could have easily been taken from the pages 
of an introductory textbook or replicated in a classroom setting and was therefore perfect for 
someone with limited field experience. Later, when asked, the paramedic said that the treatment 
was “straightforward” and his actions “by the book,” suggesting that he was focusing on the 
process of established protocols throughout the call. But what happens when paramedics “fall off 
the maps that process provides” (Brown & Duguid, 2000, p. 103)? 
One such instance occurred during another call. The paramedics were dispatched in 
response to a 911 call that simply stated a man was “stuck in the bathroom.” Upon arrival, the 
paramedics discovered the patient on his bathroom floor, pinned between the toilet and the 
bathtub, barely conscious. The volunteer fire crew who were first on the scene could not free him 
and there was no information as to what had led to this situation. According to accounts from 
neighbours, the patient had not been seen for days and it was surmised that he had been stuck to 
his bathroom floor for three days or more.  
Although confronted with this exceptional situation, the senior paramedic quickly and 
calmly took the lead, making almost instantaneous treatment decisions. He simultaneously 
delegated tasks to both his younger partner and volunteer fire personnel, began preliminary 
treatment, contained a growing crowd of bystanders, and summoned assistance from the building 
superintendent. There had been some discussion about physically removing the toilet from the 
premises, but upon noticing that there was no water shut off valve connected to the toilet, the 
paramedic directed a bystander to retrieve a bucket, and used a simple solution of water and dish 
detergent found nearby to lubricate and ultimately free the patient. The senior paramedic then led 
a group of four people in the transferring of the patient to ambulance, where he provided 
advanced care all the way to the hospital.  
When paramedics find themselves in non-textbook situations like the bathroom example 
above, judgment and critical thinking can lead to actions extending beyond the limits of standard 
protocols. There are no roadmaps available to navigate through such territory. The main 
observable difference (other than the obvious difference in medical circumstances) in the two 
cases was in the clinical approach of the paramedics. As paramedics gain more experience, it 
seems that their approach is driven less by protocols and more by an overall understanding of 
paramedicine, while younger paramedics are more likely to follow protocols by rote, without a 
sense of the larger picture. The different experience levels and attitudes of paramedics can be 
analyzed with reference to Lave and Wenger’s (1991) concept of newcomers and old-timers, and 
learning in practice through legitimate peripheral participation
1. Newcomers often operate in a linear fashion, from one protocol to the next, 
processing consecutive bits of information. Old-timers perceive their work in a broader 
manner, relying on their experience and their understanding of their practice. They simply 
“practice medicine out there” (senior paramedic), processing complicated, one-of-a-kind calls 
with an ease and confidence that comes from experience. Despite regularly “travelling off road 
and without maps…they got to where they needed to go, nonetheless” (Brown & Duguid, 
2000, p. 104). Paramedic partners learn from their experience and from each other; as the 
newcomers work with the old-timers, they gain a better understanding of their practice, and are 
able to holistically apply medical protocols. Newcomers gradually take on more complicated 
tasks, and are able to handle the complex calls that their old-timer partners may have originally 
had to handle. 
 
Organized Chaos 
Fighting fires is dangerous, challenging, unpredictable work, which firefighters 
describe as “organized chaos.” They continuously refer to the fact that regardless of their level 
of training or previous experiences, they do not see any call as routine – anything can happen. 
Looking ahead, preparing for the worst and being ready to adapt is key in firefighting due to its 
unpredictable nature. “You have to be the biggest pessimist on the scene…what possibly could 
go wrong and do I have the resources to cover that in case things do go bad” (officer). 
The department works within an incident command (decision-making) system that is 
distinctively suited to the emergent nature of firefighters’ work, assisting them in responding to 
small, large, or developing incidents. The incident command system (ICS) provides a 
framework for responding to a variety of emergencies, providing steps to follow so as to 
manage an emergency situation. It is a policy that combines guidelines with flexibility and lays 
out the standard method to carry out actions once a decision has been made, allowing 
firefighters to adapt to any situation as required. In order for ICS to work properly, department 
members explained that they must fully understand the system as well as the nature of 
firefighting itself, and use their own experience as a foundation in their work.  
When firefighters were asked for their understandings of ICS and how it affects their 
work, their answers were quite similar. They emphasized that ICS was a flexible, effective way 
to “organize chaos” and coordinate action, helping all firefighters work as a team with one goal 
and assigned tasks. Although ICS can be expressed in flowcharts and Standard Operating 
Guidelines (SOGs), its implementation more closely resembles a living organism than a static 
policy. “Every call is unique” (officer) and the responses to each call change depending on the 
situation and the personnel involved. 
It is this human element that takes a linear model and makes it adaptive because 
“everything’s great on paper, but nothing ever goes that smooth” in reality (officer). Therefore, 
firefighters must “organize chaos” and “adapt, adjust, adjust, adjust” (officer). Officers are 
responsible for commanding incidents, and each officer handles incidents in different ways, 
even though they work with the same system. Two officers explained this with references to 
different ways of flowing down the same river, and also acting like MacGyver [a 1980s TV 
character who applied extremely creative, often improvisational scientific solutions to difficult 
and dangerous situations]. In addition, different officers have different strengths in handling 
                                                
1 Lave & Wenger (1991) also discuss how members learn “to be” members of their communities, and learn the 
culture of their organizations. We found the same dynamic in our research, but space precludes such its discussion 
here. 
calls. Officers explained that those who are more efficient at a call have a better understanding 
of how ICS works and have had more practice working with it. Sometimes, however, officers 
have a tendency to over-rely on the ICS checklists, hitting the requirements merely by rote, 
without applying them to each particular situation. 
Introduced within the last decade, incident command is a relatively new policy for this 
firefighting department. Firefighters who have joined the department since ICS’s 
implementation have a better grasp on ICS than do their older counterparts. These newer 
members of the department think and act differently in relation to the task of firefighting 
because of their continuous exposure to incident command. Incident command is integral to 
newcomers’ work, whereas it may be seen as more of an add-on to old-timers who did not 
progress through the ranks with ICS. In this role reversal, it is more often the new firefighters 
who have a better understanding of ICS, although old-timers have a better understanding of 
firefighting itself, due to their years of experience with the department. New firefighters have 
had continuous exposure to ICS, and it is “practically seen all the time” (new firefighter) while 
some of those who were firefighters before ICS don’t really understand it. They grasp parts of 
it, but “don’t quite grasp the whole thing” (officer). One officer said of himself, “In the overall 
time of my career, it still is relatively new…. I guess what I'm saying, you still have to actually 
think about all the aspects of it.”  
Referring again to Brown and Duguid’s (2000) concept of understanding versus 
directive documentation, it is apparent that firefighters must have a deep understanding of the 
nature of incident command, and draw on their experience in the field. An officer who simply 
follows the steps or goes through checklists will not be as effective as one who thoroughly 
understands the policy and makes judgments based on what is best, rather than what the 
manual lays out. 
Some of what firefighters learn can be explicitly taught, but much is also learned in 
practice and through legitimate peripheral participation (Lave & Wenger, 1991). One officer 
stated that what they do is impossible to describe, and must be experienced personally to be 
understood. It is therefore very difficult to pass on these understandings to new firefighters. 
The ability to tackle problems and adapt is key, and the only way to adapt is through 
experience. Firefighters must learn by doing, with jobs of increasing skill, decision-making, 
and complexity. As a member of a crew, new firefighters are never alone at a call, but may 
often be attending to duties without the immediate physical presence of a colleague. 
Furthermore, rookie firefighters learn some things only briefly during their recruit 
training, such as auto extrication, and are therefore given “helping jobs” when they first 
encounter these situations with their crew. They start with simple tasks and gradually take on 
more complicated roles; “hands-on” practice is very important. This is similar to how 
firefighters work with specialty teams such as trench rescue. For instance, an officer 
encouraged his crews to take the time to observe trench team training in order to increase their 
understanding of trench rescue in the event they needed to support the team in a real situation. 
Learning is also affected by the differences between rookies and more experienced 
firefighters due to differing experience levels affecting the actions of crews, their perceived 
capabilities, and mentoring opportunities. When there is an ideal mix of newcomers and old-
timers, there are increased learning opportunities within the crew. Newcomers learn from old-
timers through questioning and observation, and old-timers learn from mentoring the 
newcomers. However, the department is experiencing rapid growth with the addition of many 
new recruits, resulting in a dilution of experience levels. It is becoming increasingly difficult to 
evenly disperse new recruits to more experienced crews, reducing the rich learning 
opportunities that are created through the interaction of newcomers and old-timers. 
Nonetheless, the department strives continuously to support the learning of its firefighters, 
through formal upgrading and requalification, mandatory training, observation, discussion, and 
debriefing. As one officer stated, “everybody is always looking at how we can do it 
better…this is what I like about” our department. 
 
Conclusion 
Paramedics and firefighters encounter extreme variables in their work, while facing life 
and death situations. Both organizations require extensive formal training and frequent 
professional development/upgrading sessions, but their formal education is only a beginning; it 
is in their practice that they truly understand their professional work. Our research indicates 
that developing understandings through experience is paramount to the success of these 
emergency response personnel. Paramedics and firefighters have developed ways to adapt to 
the medical protocol and incident command systems. By fitting the reality of their practices 
into the policies of their respective organizations, they “do a better service to the general 
public” (paramedic). Through learning in practice and from each other, these paramedics and 
firefighters have developed the ability to respond to emergent situations, adapt policy into 
practice, and navigate through the grey areas and organized chaos of their professions. 
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